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Every revolution is preceded by a state of general 
exhaustion and takes place against a background of 
unleashed aggressiveness. Authority cannot put up with a 
nation that gets on its nerves; the nation cannot tolerate an 
authority it has come to hate. Authority has squandered all 
its credibility and has empty hands, the nation has lost the 
final scrap of patience and makes a fist. A climate of 
tension and increasing oppressiveness prevails. We start to 
fall into a psychosis of terror. The discharge is coming. We 
feel it.1 
The tumultuous aftermath of Iran‘s disputed presidential election 
and the three years of tension and turbulence since have sparked 
renewed debate about the vitality of Iran‘s century old democratic 
movement. The same social forces that sparked Iran‘s Constitutional 
Revolution at the turn of the twentieth century, brought Prime 
Minister Mossadegh to power in the 1950s, and overthrew the Shah 
in 1979, have dramatically and unexpectedly forced the arc of 
history. While Iran‘s democratic movement currently lingers in a 
kind of ―political purgatory,‖2 the future trajectory of Iran‘s political 
evolution towards a more representative government is a subject of 
great interest and importance. Furthermore, the revolutionary wave 
currently sweeping across the Arab world raises serious questions 
 
† Executive Articles Editor, Maryland Journal of International Law 2011–2012; J.D. University 
of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, May 2012. The author wishes to thank his 
parents for their love and support, and Professor Peter Danchin for his guidance and feedback. 
 1. RYSZARD KAPUŚCIŃSKI, SHAH OF SHAHS 104 (William R. Brand & Katarzyna 
Mroczkowska-Brand trans., Vintage International 1992) (1985). 
 2. Carnegie Endowment, Taking Tehran‟s Temperature: One Year On, YOUTUBE (July 
12, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2DvgQ8JkLVM. 
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about the nature of democracy in the Middle East and the role 
religion will play in the political architecture of Islamic societies. 
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increasing 
trend towards regarding democracy as a universal norm under 
international law as well as a trend towards international de-
legitimization of efforts by governments to subvert democratic 
institutions and procedures.3 Numerous international covenants 
drafted in the latter half of the twentieth century, such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), the African Charter on 
Human and People‘s Rights (ACHPR), and the Charter of the 
Organization of American States (OAS), increasingly form a body of 
custom with respect to the universality of democratic norms.4 
Many commentators, most famously Francis Fukuyama, have 
argued that liberal democracy is not only a universally desirable norm 
under international law, but the inevitable and final stage of human 
sociopolitical development.5 Fukuyama‘s original essay dealt mainly 
with the ideological death of Marxism-Leninism after the Cold War, 
but Fukuyama has more recently expanded his thesis to discuss 
Islamic fundamentalism, claiming that the appeal of radical Islamist 
ideologies is limited, and that Muslim societies will either become 
successful democracies like Turkey or will adopt a strict 
interpretation of Sharia law and collapse in on themselves like 
Afghanistan or Pakistan.6 Fukuyama‘s thesis is flawed, as Muslim 
voters in countries such as Turkey, Egypt and Tunisia seem to see 
little contradiction between Islam and participation in a generally 
open and pluralistic society.7  
After establishing that there exists an international legal norm in 
favor of democracy, this paper will then proceed to discuss how the 
present government of Iran, the Islamic Republic, has violated this 
 
 3. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. 
INT‘L L. 46, 46 (1992). 
 4. See infra Part I. 
 5. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992). 
 6. Francis Fukuyama, They Can Only Go So Far, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2008, at B1. 
 7. Recent elections in post-revolutionary Egypt and Tunisia, albeit somewhat flawed 
and in Egypt‘s case led to broad majorities for the Muslim Brotherhood and the radical 
Salafi movement, nonetheless represent the beginnings of modern civil society in the Arab 
world.  
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norm, most prominently its obligations under the terms of the ICCPR, 
to which Iran has been a party since 1975.8 The ICCPR requires state 
parties to hold periodic and genuine elections, provides guarantees 
against arbitrary arrest and torture, and enshrines safeguards to ensure 
due process.9 While Iran‘s present constitution contains many of 
these protections, and ostensibly provides for regular, free elections, 
the theocratic structures created by Iranian law and custom neuter 
these guarantees.10 However, as scholars such as Alfred Stepan have 
argued, the fact that a country‘s laws and customs enshrine religious 
elements does not necessarily preclude the emergence of successful, 
pluralistic democracies.11 Iran does not necessarily have to become a 
rigidly secularist state on the Kemalist model to become a successful 
democracy.12 
I. THE EMERGING NORM IN FAVOR OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
In 1992 Professor Thomas Franck published his landmark article 
The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, in which he argued 
that a growing body of treaty law and state practice were converging 
to form an increasingly coherent international norm in favor of 
democratic governance and the right to self-determination.13 Franck 
cited two contemporary examples: (1) the international community‘s 
overwhelmingly negative response to the overthrow of the 
democratically elected government of President Jean Bertrand 
Aristide in Haiti, and (2) the reaction of the Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe to the failed Soviet coup against Mikhail 
Gorbachev.14 Franck also noted how regional organizations such as 
 
 8. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 25, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 179 (entered into force March 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 9. Id. arts. 7, 9, 14, 25. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See Alfred C. Stepan, Religion, Democracy and the “Twin Tolerations”, J. 
DEMOCRACY, Oct. 2000, at 37. 
 12. See infra Part III.  
 13. Franck, supra note 3, at 47.  
 14. Id. at 46–47. In the aftermath of the failed 1991 coup attempt, the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe passed a resolution ―condemning unreservedly forces 
which seek to take power from a representative government of a participating State against 
the will of the people as expressed in free and fair elections and contrary to the justly 
established constitutional order‖ and ―supporting vigorously, in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations, in case of overthrow or attempted overthrow of a legitimately elected 
government of a participating state by undemocratic means.‖ Conference on Security & Co-
operation in Europe [CSCE], Document of the Moscow Meeting on the Human Dimension of 
the CSCE, ¶¶ 17.1–.2, 30 I.L.M. 1670, 1677 (1991). The CSCE is the predecessor 
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the OAS were increasingly taking action to condemn un-democratic 
regimes and their conduct, citing the example of the OAS 
condemnation of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle for 
his brutal efforts to suppress the Nicaraguan Revolution.15 For most 
of the
 
20th century it seemed that cynical political calculations, often 
related to the heated atmosphere surrounding Cold War politics, 
rather than the democratic character of the government in question, 
determined whether or not a particular government was recognized as 
legitimate and thus empowered to represent the state 
internationally.16 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been an 
increasingly universal customary international legal norm, 
demonstrated by state practice and opinio juris, supporting 
democratic governments against extra-constitutional seizures of 
power. Until that time, there was a generally accepted understanding 
that the internal character of a government was, as a matter of 
international law, irrelevant to whether or not that government, as 
distinct from the state, was to be considered legitimate.17 Recognition 
of governments was considered as a bi-lateral question, resolved by 
individual states according to a wide array of varying political 
calculations.18  
To the extent that international law prescribed any standard for 
determining the legitimacy of a government, the most commonly 
cited standard was the ―Effective Control‖ test embodied in the 
Tinoco arbitration, which posited that there were several relevant 
factors in determining the right of a government to bind a state 
internationally: 
The question is, has it [the government] really established 
itself in such a way that all within its influence recognize its 
 
organization to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Who We 
Are, ORG. FOR SEC. AND CO-OPERATION IN EUR., http://www.osce.org/who/87 (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2012). 
 15. Franck, supra note 3, at 65.  
 16. See generally Matthew Griffin, Accrediting Democracies: Does The Credentials 
Committee of the United Nations Promote Democracy Through its Accreditation Process, 
and Should It?, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 725 (2000) (discussing the debates in the United 
Nations General Assembly concerning the right to represent Cambodia after the collapse of 
the Khmer Rouge regime). 
 17. See infra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 18. P.K. MENON, THE LAW OF RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BASIC PRINCIPLES 
84–85 (1994). 
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control, and that there is no opposing force assuming to be 
a government in its place? Is it discharging its functions as 
a government usually does, respected within its own 
jurisdiction?19 
Indeed, commentators such as Nehal Bhuta have noted that:  
The problem of any new political order is the problem that 
new institutions—however legitimate from some abstract 
normative standpoint—are ‗built on quicksand‘ and that 
unless the new claim of political authority is matched with 
effective power; during these times, ‗power and authority‘ 
is a kind of composite, a sociological datum that fuses 
facticity (the capacity to coerce, compel, or oblige) with 
validity (the authority to legitimate, rationalize, or 
normalize).20 
Bhuta further notes that: 
The authority claimed for power is predicated on a claim to 
legitimacy, but only if the claim is successful can effective 
power translate into stable domination—a state capable of 
consistently maintaining its power and authority. In the 
stabilization of a state order, cognitive, voluntary ‗consent‘ 
of each and every subject to the claimed authority for the 
exercise of power is less significant than the empirically 
general acquiescence of the population in the means by 
which power is exercised and commands enforced (or 
permissions granted).21 
The traditional view of governmental legitimacy and the factors listed 
in the Tinoco opinion mention nothing about the way the government 
in question came to power, and do not take into account the character 
of the government itself as being relevant to the question of 
legitimacy.  
 However, there is strong evidence that state practice and opinio 
juris22 have coalesced into an increasingly important norm providing 
 
 19. Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica, 1 R.I.A.A. 369, 382 (1923).  
 20. Nehal Bhuta, New Modes and Orders: The Difficulties of a Jus Post Bellum of 
Constitutional Transformation, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 799, 831 (2010) (footnote omitted). 
 21. Id. at 830 (footnote omitted). 
 22. Customary international law is generally understood to be demonstrated by state 
practice and opinio juris. See, e.g., The North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Rep. of Ger./ 
Den.; Fed. Rep. of Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 78 (Feb. 20) (―Not only must the acts 
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that the character of a government, and the way it comes to power, 
are relevant to whether or not that government is recognized as 
―legitimate‖ under international law. The clearest examples of this 
are when the international community, whether under the aegis of the 
United Nations or through regional organizations like the OAS, has 
condemned efforts by the military to subvert and overthrow 
democratic governments.23 Recently, the OAS suspended Honduras 
following what many considered a coup against the country‘s 
democratically elected president.24 
As Franck discussed, one of the first and clearest examples of 
this principle in action was the international reaction to the overthrow 
of Haiti‘s democratically elected president, Jean Bertrand-Aristide. In 
1991, Aristide was overwhelmingly elected president of Haiti in free 
and fair elections monitored by the United Nations.25 In September of 
that year, Aristide was overthrown in a coup led by the Haitian 
military.26 The international community was unanimous in 
recognizing that the military coup against the democratically elected 
government of Haiti would not be allowed to stand. The OAS 
immediately condemned the coup, and passed a resolution 
recognizing the elected government of President Aristide to be ―the 
only legitimate representatives of the Government of Haiti.‖27 The 
OAS foreign ministers also issued a declaration stating that no 
government resulting from this illegal situation would be accepted 
and urging OAS member states to freeze the assets of the Haitian 
government and impose a trade embargo on Haiti.28 
 
concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or carried out in such a 
way, as to be evidence as a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of 
a rule of law requiring it.‖). 
 23. Organization of American States [OAS], Support of the Democratic Government of 
Haiti, OEA/Ser.F/V.1/MRE/RES.1 (Oct. 3, 1991); Press Release, OAS, OAS Suspends 
Honduras (July 5, 2009), available at http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp 
?sCodigo=E-219/09.  
 24. The case of Honduras is somewhat unusual because the coup had a least a modicum 
of legal justification, having been partially legitimized by the Honduran Supreme Court. Paul 
Kiernan et al., Coup Rocks Honduras, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2009, at A1.  
 25. BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 367 (1999). 
 26. Id. at 366–67. 
 27. Support of the Democratic Government of Haiti, supra note 23. 
 28. OAS, Apoyo a la Democracia en Haiti [Support for the Democracy in Haiti], 
OEA/Ser.F/V.1/MRE/RES.2/91 (Oct. 8, 1991), available at http://www.oas.org/columbus/ 
docs/HaitiMRERES291Spa.pdf. 
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Additionally, the United Nations opposed the military coup in 
Haiti and supported the Aristide government. In 1992, the United 
Nations Credentials Committee rejected the credentials of the Haitian 
military regime and recognized the right of President Aristide‘s 
government to continue to represent Haiti.29 The UN General 
Assembly condemned the coup‘s ―illegal replacement of the 
constitutional President of Haiti, the use of violence and military 
coercion and the violation of human rights.‖30 The General Assembly 
further affirmed as unacceptable ―any entity resulting from that 
illegal situation‖ and demanded ―the immediate restoration of the 
legitimate government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, together 
with the full application of the National Constitution.‖31 
In 1994, the UN Security Council determined that the overthrow 
of the democratically elected Aristide government in Haiti 
represented a ―threat to peace and security in the region‖ and 
authorized a multinational force to ―facilitate the departure from Haiti 
of the military leadership‖ and usher in the ―the prompt return of the 
legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate 
authorities of the Government of Haiti.‖32 
In 1997, the international community again acted to oppose a 
military coup against a democratically elected government, this time 
in Sierra Leone. In that year, a group of soldiers overthrew the 
government of Ahmed Kabbah, Sierra Leone‘s first democratically 
elected president.33 The Organization for African Unity (OAU) 
condemned the coup and supported efforts by the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to take military 
action to restore the elected government.34 The United Nations also 
acted to condemn the coup, allowing the elected Kabbah government 
to retain its seat in the General Assembly.35 The UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 1132, invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter and 
 
 29. Griffin, supra note 16, at 746.  
 30. G.A. Res. 46/7, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/7 (Oct. 11, 1991). 
 31. Id. ¶ 2. 
 32. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994).  
 33. See Karsten Nowrot & Emily W. Schbacker, The Use of Force to Restore 
Democracy: International Legal Implications of the ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone, 
14 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 321, 323 (1998). 
 34. Id. at 328. 
 35. Credentials Comm., Rep. on its 52nd Sess., ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/52/719 (Dec. 11, 
1997). 
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demanding that the military junta ―take immediate steps to relinquish 
power in Sierra Leone and make way for the restoration of the 
democratically elected Government and a return to constitutional 
order.‖36  
II. THE EMERGING DEMOCRATIC NORM—INTERNATIONAL 
CONVENTIONS 
One of the sources of customary international law is state 
practice,37 and state practice, as demonstrated by the conduct of 
organizations like the UN and the OAS with respect to Haiti, Sierra 
Leone, and Honduras, clearly establishes a growing customary 
international legal norm in favor of democratic governance.38 
Another important source of international law are international 
conventions and the principles embodied therein.39 Customary 
international law clearly establishes that a pattern of international 
agreements all standing for the same proposition can demonstrate that 
a practice is so widely followed that it has become a rule of 
customary international law40 and numerous international 
conventions form a body of opinio juris and state practice that 
enshrine the increasingly universal customary international norm of 
 
 36. S.C. Res. 1132, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (Oct. 8, 1997). 
 37. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 183 
(June 27) (observing that the Court must consider ―practice and opinio juris of States‖). 
 38. See supra Part II. The recent international reaction to the military coup in the West 
African nation of Mali is further evidence of this trend. On March 21, 2012, a group of 
officers overthrew the elected government of President Amadou Toumani Touré. On April 6, 
2012, after widespread international condemnation and the imposition of trade and economic 
sanctions by ECOWAS, the ruling junta agreed to step down in favor of a transitional 
civilian government that will be tasked with organizing free elections. Mali coup leaders to 
stand down as part of ECOWAS deal, BBC NEWS, Apr. 6, 2012. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world 
-africa-17642276. 
 39. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), 33 U.N.T.S 993. 
Article 38 reads as follows: The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:  
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.  
Id. 
 40. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Rep. of Ger./Den.; Fed. Rep. of 
Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 73–74 (Feb. 20). 
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democratic governance. Numerous international conventions, 
including several to which the Islamic Republic of Iran is party, have 
increasingly enshrined the norm of democratic governance and 
genuine, periodic elections. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UNDHR) states that ―everyone has the right to take 
part in the government of his country, directly or through freely 
chosen representatives‖ where ―the will of the people shall be the 
basis of the authority of government‖ and more precisely that ―this 
will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall 
be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or 
by equivalent free voting procedures.‖41  
Numerous regional conventions also enshrine the norm in favor 
of democratic governance. The Organization of American States 
Charter has several provisions to ensure the vitality of representative 
government, including the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and 
the Renewal of the Inter-American system, giving special priority to 
―strengthening representative democracy as an expression of the 
legitimate and free manifestation of the will of the people.‖42 In 1991 
the OAS passed Resolution 1080, which requires the organization‘s 
Secretary General to call for an immediate meeting if there is a 
―sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political 
institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the 
democratically elected government in any of the Organization‘s 
member states.‖43 Furthermore, Resolution 1080 establishes a 
specific procedure for defending democracy against the military 
coups that have plagued Latin American for decades, as happened in 
countries such as Haiti, Peru, Guatemala and Honduras.44 In 1992 the 
OAS amended its charter with the Protocol of Washington, which 
requires the suspension of any OAS government whose regime came 
to power through a coup or by otherwise overthrowing a 
 
 41. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III), art. 21 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 42. See OAS, Inter-American Democratic Charter, arts. 17–22, G.A. Res. 1, OAS Doc. 
OEA/Ser.P/AG/RES/1 (XXVIII-E/01) (Sept. 11, 2001) (detailing collective action 
mechanism to preserve at-risk state‘s ―democratic system‖); OAS Gen. Assembly 
Proceedings, 21st Sess., Volume 1, at 2, OAS/Ser.P/XXI.O.2 (June 4, 1991) (reprinting The 
Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System), 
available at http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/agres/ag03805E01.pdf.  
 43. OAS, Representative Democracy, G.A. Res. 1080, ¶ 1, OAS Doc. AG/RES/1080 
(XXI-O/91) (June 5, 1991).  
 44. See generally Stephen J. Schnably, The Santiago Commitment as a Call to 
Democracy in the United States: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala, 25 
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 393 (1994). 
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democratically elected government.45 Article 3 of the First Protocol 
to the European Convention on Human Rights provides that ―the 
High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at 
reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will 
ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice 
of the legislature.‖46 Article 23 of the American Convention 
guarantees that every citizen shall have the right to ―take part in the 
conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives‖ and to ―vote and to be elected in genuine periodic 
elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by 
secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of the 
voters.‖47 Article 13 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ 
Rights contains similar language, guaranteeing ―every citizen shall 
have the right to participate freely in the government of his country, 
either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance 
with the provisions of the law.‖48 
Perhaps the most important international convention with respect 
to the importance of maintaining democratic norms is the ICCPR, to 
which Iran has been a state party since 1975.49 Article 25 of the 
ICCPR guarantees that every citizen shall have the right and the 
opportunity ―to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives‖ and ―to vote and to be elected 
at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free 
expression of the will of the electors.‖50 The ICCPR also guarantees 
important freedoms, such as: due process rights,51 the right to 
 
 45. OAS, Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American 
States (Protocol of Washington), G.A. Amend. 56, art. I, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.A/2 Add. 3 
(SEPF) (Dec. 14, 1992) (adding Article 9 to the OAS Charter, which provides that ―[a] 
Member of the Organization whose democratically constituted government has been 
overthrown by force may be suspended from the exercise of the right to participate‖ in 
OAS). 
 46. Protocol to Amend the Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 3, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262. 
 47. OAS, American Convention on Human Rights art. 23(1), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. 
No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144.  
 48. Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights art. 
13(1), June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217.  
 49. ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 25. 
 50. Id. art. 25(a)–(b). 
 51. Id. art. 14. 
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freedom of assembly,52 freedom of association,53 and freedom of 
expression.54 
In addition to violating the general customary norm in favor of 
democratic elections embodied in international conventions, Iran has 
also repeatedly violated its own specific obligations under Article 25 
of the ICCPR. While Article 25‘s requirement for ―genuine‖ elections 
is somewhat ambiguous, it seems certain that, at a minimum, a 
―genuine‖ election would have to be one where the victor was not 
determined in advance and where the ballots cast are fairly counted. 
Furthermore, for it to be an election in the literal sense there would 
have to be two or more candidates for a given position, or at least a 
reasonable opportunity for opposition candidates to enter the race. To 
take two extreme examples, it seems certain that elections in North 
Korea, or in Saddam Hussein‘s Iraq, would not qualify as ―genuine‖ 
under the ICCPR. Parliamentary elections in North Korea have been 
described as: 
[L]argely a formality, since only one candidate is listed on 
the ballot in each constituency. Officially, the vote is secret. 
But those who oppose the sole candidate must go to a 
special booth to cross out the name before placing it in a 
ballot box—an act of rebellion defectors say is all but 
unthinkable.55  
Similarly, in Saddam Hussein‘s Iraq, Iraqis were required to cast 
ballots—in their own blood—in a 2002 referendum on confirming 
Saddam‘s rule.56 
Under this interpretation, Iran has been in violation of Article 25 
of the ICCPR for nearly 37 years, since Iran acceded to the 
convention in 1975. In 1975, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi, abolished Iran‘s multi-party system (which had itself been a 
farce since the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953) and 
replaced it with a one party system under the aegis of the Rastakhiz 
 
 52. Id. art. 21. 
 53. Id. art. 22. 
 54. Id. art. 19. 
 55. Jean H. Lee, North Korea „Votes‟ for New Parliament, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 8, 2009, 
http://www.thestar.com/News/World/article/598600.  
 56. David Blair, Iraqis vote in blood for Saddam, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 16, 2002, 12:01 
AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/1410387/Iraqis-vote-in-
blood-for-Saddam.html.  
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(Resurgence) Party.57 All Iranians were required by law to become 
members of the party, and refusal to do so was essentially deemed 
treasonous—those not wishing to join the party were supposed to be 
offered their passports and a passage to exile.58 
Following the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, Iran‘s political 
system has changed to make meaningful democracy nearly 
impossible. For instance, a Guardian Council determines in advance 
which candidates are ideologically acceptable and may stand in Iran‘s 
presidential and parliamentary elections.59 Furthermore, millions of 
Iranians continue to believe that, in addition to tilting the playing 
field against opposition candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi, the Islamic 
Republic falsified the 2009 presidential election results to show a 
victory for its favored candidate, thus making the election a farce 
even by the Islamic Republic‘s own standards.60  
III. DEMOCRACY AND RELIGION 
Parts I and II of this paper have established that there is an 
increasingly universal customary international legal norm in favor of 
democratic governance.61 This norm is embodied in state practice and 
numerous international conventions.62 Part III established that Iran, 
by failing to hold genuine elections, is in violation of this norm and 
its own specific treaty obligations under the International Convention 
on Civil and Political Rights.63 This section discusses the steps Iran 
must take in order to meet its obligations under customary 
international law and treaties such as the ICCPR. 
 
 57. SIR ANTHONY PARSONS, THE PRIDE AND THE FALL: IRAN 1974–1979, at 16 (1984). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See KARIM SADJADPOUR, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT‘L PEACE, READING 
KHAMENEI: THE WORLD VIEW OF IRAN‘S MOST POWERFUL LEADER 7 (2009), available at 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/sadjadpour 
_iran_final2.pdf. 
 60. Since there has never been an independent, impartial audit of the 2009 Iranian 
presidential election results, it may be some time before it is clear what happened in June of 
2009. In addition to violating its Article 25 obligations, the Islamic Republic has also 
violated virtually every other provision of the ICCPR, including the right to a fair trial, the 
prohibition on torture, and the rights to freedom of assembly and expression. For 
documentation of these abuses, particularly those that have occurred since Iran‘s disputed 
presidential election, see IRAN HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTER, A YEAR LATER: 
SUPPRESSION CONTINUES IN IRAN (2010), available at http://www.iranhrdc.org/ 
english/publications/reports/3162-a-year-later-suppression-continues-in-iran.html. 
 61. See supra Parts I–II. 
 62. See supra Part II. 
 63. See supra Part II. 
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Unlike some of the world‘s more notorious recent dictatorships 
such as Ba‘athist Iraq, North Korea, or Communist Cuba, Iran is a 
comparatively open and pluralistic society. Indeed, Iran‘s constitution 
guarantees many important civil, political, and economic rights, and 
in its early drafts was based largely on the Constitution of the French 
Fifth Republic.64 However, the draft constitution was modified 
numerous times during the turbulent early days after the Iranian 
Revolution, in each case to grant more power to the Iranian clergy, 
who were slowly winning the battle for post-revolutionary control.65  
The process, through which the democratic ambitions of the 
1979 revolution became fused with the Ayatollah Khomeini‘s 
totalitarian theocratic vision, is a fascinating one,66 and these dueling, 
irreconcilable impulses are reflected in Iran‘s constitution. The 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic grants the Supreme Leader 
(whose title more accurately translates as ―Leader of the Revolution‖) 
extraordinary powers over the levers of state and charges him with 
defending the ideals of the Islamic Revolution.67 The Supreme 
Leader has the power to appoint members of: the judiciary, state 
radio and television, Iran‘s armed forces, the Revolutionary Guards 
and the Guardian Council, which has the authority to veto 
parliamentary decisions it believes conflict with Islam and to bar 
ideologically unsuitable candidates from running in Iranian 
elections.68  
These broad powers effectively grant one person either the direct 
or indirect power over Iran‘s executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches and make the Islamic Republic a de jure dictatorship.69 
Granting any one official such extraordinary, unreviewable powers 
 
 64. See infra notes 72–79 and accompanying text. See also Omar Sial, A Guide to the 
Legal System of the Islamic Republic of Iran, NYU LAW GLOBAL (Mar. 2006), 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Iran.htm. 
 65. Sial, supra note 64.  
 66. For a history of the machinations that went into drafting and adopting of Iran‘s 
current constitution, see Said Saffari, The Legitimation of the Clergy‟s Right to Rule in the 
Iranian Constitution of 1979, 20 BRIT. J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 64 (1993). 
 67. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 110.  
 68. See SADJADPOUR, supra note 60. 
 69. The Islamic Republic‘s constitution does state that the legislative, executive and 
judiciary branches of government are intended to be separate. However, it also states that all 
three branches of government will be supervised by the absolute authority of the Supreme 
Leader and the clergy. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 57. 
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would make democratic governance virtually impossible. However, 
the Constitution of the Islamic Republic also requires that the 
Supreme Leader be a member of the clergy, making the country a de 
jure theocracy.70  
In spite of this broad grant of authority, Iran‘s constitution 
appears at a glance to be in many ways a surprisingly democratic and 
progressive document, barring discrimination on the basis of ethnic 
affiliation,71 sex,72 and providing guarantees for the rights of 
women.73 Iran‘s constitution also provides for many civil and 
political rights, including freedom of the press74, freedom of 
assembly,75 privacy protections,76 and a specific ban on the use of 
torture by the government.77 The constitution of Iran also provides 
for a democratically elected president.78  
However, virtually all these civil and political rights are 
specifically qualified by the requirement that they exist only so far as 
they do not ―conflict with the principles of Islam.‖79 As a matter of 
law and custom, the Supreme Leader, his subordinates, and clerical 
bodies such as the Guardian Council are charged with interpreting 
how Islamic doctrine applies to Iranian constitutional rights.80 Indeed, 
 
 70. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 109. Iran‘s original Islamic Constitution, adopted in 
1980, required the Supreme Leader to be a marja, the highest rank achievable for a Shi‘a 
Muslim clergyman. SADJADPOUR, supra note 60, at 6. Iran‘s constitution was amended in 
1989 to remove this requirement in part to allow Iran‘s current Supreme Leader, Ali 
Khamenei, who was a mid-level clergyman at the time of time of his elevation to Leader, to 
take over the office from Ayatollah Khomeini upon his death. Id.  
 71. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 19. 
 72. Id. art. 20.  
 73. Id. art. 21.  
 74. Id. art. 24. 
 75. Id. art. 27.  
 76. Id. art. 25.  
 77. Id. art. 38. Article 38 of Iran‘s constitution also appears to bestow a privilege against 
self-incrimination, although in practice this guarantee is virtually never honored, and coerced 
confessions are extremely common. See generally ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN, TORTURED 
CONFESSIONS: PRISONS AND PUBLIC RECANTATIONS IN MODERN IRAN (1999). 
 78. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 114. 
 79.  Id. arts. 4, 20–21, 26–28.  
 80. See Edward Yeranian, Iran‟s Supreme Leader Says He Represents the Prophet 
Muhammad on Earth, VOA (July, 21, 2010), http://www.voanews.com/english/news/ 
middle-east/Irans-Supreme-Leader-Says-He-Represents-Prophet-Muhammad-on-Earth-
98945624.html. 
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the Ayatollah Khamenei has gone as far as to declare that his power 
is absolute, and that all must ―obey him‖ since he speaks as the 
―representative of the Prophet Muhammad and [Shi‘ism‘s] 12th 
Imam on Earth.‖81 By qualifying fundamental constitutional rights by 
stating that they are subject to the whims of a megalomaniac who 
literally claims to be God‘s Prophet on Earth, the Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic makes those guarantees virtually meaningless. 
Furthermore, given the hideous human rights record of the Islamic 
regime82 it seems extraordinarily unlikely that the Supreme Leader 
and his subordinates will use the process of Islamic interpretation to 
expand civil and political rights. 
In addition to granting the Supreme Leader and his associates 
warrant to suppress any dissent in the name of religious authority,83 
any constitution with a theocratic foundation necessarily grants 
officials of state the power to enforce, at their whim, prejudices 
against religious minorities and women. While Iran has an ancient 
and noble tradition of respect for other cultures and religions,84 the 
Islamic regime has long persecuted members of the Baha‘i faith on 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. IRAN HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CTR., supra note 61.  
 83. Iranians who opposed the Islamic Republic, and in particular those who oppose the 
imposition of the Velayat-e-Faqih are not considered enemies of the state as such, but 
heretics. Iranian dissidents brought to trial are typically charged with Moharebeh (waging 
war against God) or the related crime of Mofsed-e-filarz (sowing corruption on earth). Both 
crimes are punishable by death. See, e.g., Peter Walker, Iranian Court Jails Human Rights 
Activist for „Waging War Against God‟, GUARDIAN, Sept. 19, 2010, http://www.guardian.co 
.uk/world/2010/sep/19/iranian-court-jails-human-rights-activist; Neil MacFarquhar, Iran‟s 
Leader Derides Protests; Lawmakers Urge Death for Opposition Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
16, 2011, at A1. Velayat-e-Faqih, typically translated as ―Rule of the Jurisprudent‖ or 
―Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists‖, is the state ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
While historically the concept had given the Islamic clergy custodianship of the poor and 
insane, the Ayatollah Khomeini expanded this idea to include everyone living in an Islamic 
society, positing that a high ranking Islamic scholar should interpret Islam for all members 
of society in all matters. The concept is a highly controversial interpretation of Shi‘a Islamic 
teachings and is not by any means universally accepted, even by high ranking Shi‘a 
clergymen such as the Ayatollah Sistani.  
 84. Shirin Ebadi, in her speech accepting the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize, commented on 
Iran‘s ancient tradition of tolerance and respect for other cultures: 
I am an Iranian. A descendent of Cyrus the Great. The very emperor who 
proclaimed at the pinnacle of power 2500 years ago that ―. . . he would not 
reign over the people if they did not wish it. And [he] promised not to force any 
person to change his religion and faith and guaranteed freedom for all.‖ The 
Charter of Cyrus the Great is one of the most important documents that should 
be studied in the history of human rights. 
Shirin Ebadi, Nobel Lecture at the Nobel Institute (Dec. 10, 2003) (transcript available at 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2003/ebadi-lecture-e.html). 
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religious grounds.85 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic, while 
granting religious freedom to Zoroastrians, Christians, and Jews, 
intentionally refuses to recognize the rights of Baha‘is.86  
Having said all this, authors such as Alfred Stepan argue that 
even though a country‘s laws and customs enshrine religious 
elements, this does not necessarily preclude successful, pluralistic 
democracy. Stepan correctly argued that many democratic countries, 
particularly those in Western Europe, have carved out a role for 
religion in society without allowing doctrinaire theocracy to 
overwhelm the public sphere.87 For instance Greece, a deeply 
religious country88 and incidentally the birthplace of democracy, has 
enshrined a role for its own Eastern Orthodox faith in the Greek 
constitution while still maintaining a pluralistic democracy.89 In the 
United Kingdom, the British monarch is not only the head of the 
armed forces, but also the leader of the Church of England, and in 
many English schools, church doctrine is taught not only as history, 
but as divine truth.90 Countries like Germany and Austria permit local 
 
 85. For a recent history of persecution of Iranian Baha‘is, see generally IRAN HUMAN 
RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CTR., A FAITH DENIED: THE PERSECUTION OF THE BAHÁ‘ÍS OF IRAN 
(2006), http://www.iranhrdc.org/english/publications/reports/3149-a-faith-denied-the-
persecution-of-the-baha-is-of-iran.html; IRAN HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CTR., 
COMMUNITY UNDER SIEGE: THE ORDEAL OF THE BAHÁ‘ÍS OF SHIRAZ (2007), http:// 
www.iranhrdc.org/english/publications/reports/3151-community-under-siege%3A-the-
ordeal-of-the-baha%E2%80%99is-of-shiraz.html. The persecution of Baha‘is in Iran 
predates the Islamic Republic, but has always been founded on theological differences.  
 86. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 13. Islam recognizes the rights of so-called ―People of 
the Book,‖ specifically Christians and Jews, whose holy books and revelations predated 
Islam, and were later incorporated into Islamic doctrine. Shi‘a Islam as practiced in Iran also 
recognizes the rights of Zoroastrians. The nature of the theological warrant for the 
persecution of the Baha‘is essentially stems from the fact the Baha‘ism claims as part of its 
faith prophets and revelations after those of the Prophet Muhammad. As Islam claims to be 
God‘s final and complete revelation to humanity, claiming any divine revelations after the 
fact would, from an Islamic perspective, be necessarily false and heretical. 
 87. Stepan, supra note 11, at 41. 
 88. Between 95 and 98 percent of Greeks are members of the Eastern Orthodox faith, 81 
percent of Greek citizens believe that there is a God, and a further 16 percent believed in 
some sort of spirit or life force. DIRECTORATE GEN. PRESS AND COMMC‘N, EUROPEAN 
COMM‘N, SPECIAL EUROBAROMETER: SOCIAL VALUES, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 9 (2005), 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_225_report_en.pdf. 
 89. Indeed, Greece‘s constitution enshrines the role of the Eastern Orthodox Church in 
Greek society. 2008 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] 2, art. 3. 
 90. The author Christopher Hitchens once related a story regarding the teaching of 
church doctrine in British schools, as explained by Mrs. Jean Watts, who taught nature class 
at Hitchens' boarding school when he was 9 years old. Barbara Bradley Hagerty, for 
Hitchens, in Life and Death, an Unaware Cosmos, NPR (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.npr.org 
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churches to play an important role in national civic and economic 
life.91  
Indeed, it seems that democracies that promote an aggressive 
brand of secularism are the exception rather than the rule, and often 
subscribe to this model of secular organization in a variety of 
different ways for reasons peculiar to their own histories. As Stepan 
notes, a country like France, with its specific constitutional guarantee 
of ―Laïcité‖ evolved its conception of the proper role of the church in 
public affairs during the inter-religious turmoil following the French 
Revolution, and even so, France still dedicates a large percentage of 
its public education budget for Catholic private schools.92 The First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was similarly born out of 
religious conflict, and American politicians frequently make public 
displays of piety to win support. Finally, the most militant secular 
state in the world, the Republic of Turkey, has only developed 
towards democracy by allowing the full participation of Islamic 
parties, including the current governing party of Turkey, the AKP. 
There is a dramatic difference between a constitutional structure 
that incorporates religious belief into civic life and one that forcibly 
imposes religious doctrine and forbids dissent. The former structure, 
even if not explicitly secular, would certainly be consistent with 
democratic governance—the latter, as practiced in Iran, would not. 
As such, Alfred Stepan‘s definition of democracy could certainly 
include a constitutional structure with a religious foundation, or a 
secular democracy that permitted competition by religious parties:  
Democracy is a system of conflict regulation that allows 
open competition over values and goals that citizens want 
to advance. In the strict democratic sense, this means that 
as long as groups do not use violence, do not violate the 
rights of other citizens, and advance their interests within 
the rules of the democratic game, all groups are granted the 
 
/2011/12/16/143830372/for-hitchens-in-life-and-death-an-unaware-cosmos. He recalled that 
Mrs. Watts explained that God had made the grass and the leaves green as a gift to mankind, 
saying that green grass was proof of the glory of God, because He could have made 
vegetation ―orange or red, something that would clash with our eyes, whereas green is the 
most restful color for our eyes.‖ Id.  
 91. See Stepan supra note 11, at 41. 
 92. Id. at 42. 
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right to advance their interests, both in civil society, and in 
political society.93 
Furthermore, just as there is no inherent conflict between the 
inclusion of religion in civic life and the maintenance of democracy, 
there is no conflict whatever between particular religions, such as 
Islam, and pluralistic democracy. Indeed, Stepan, who wrote his 
article years before the Arab Spring, rebuts the false impression that 
Islam is incompatible with democracy by noting that a case can be 
made that about half of all the world‘s Muslims live in ―democracies, 
near-democracies, or intermittent democracies,‖ and that the number 
is higher still if one includes Indonesia.94  
Finally, there is also nothing in Iran‘s own experience with 
democracy that would prevent it from blending together civic and 
religious life in a democratic, pluralistic context. Iran can still 
preserve an important role for Islam in its constitutional framework 
without sacrificing the basic principles of democracy. Indeed, Iran‘s 
pre-revolutionary constitution, while certainly imperfect by modern 
standards, declared Islam the official state religion and granted the 
clergy certain judicial powers, guaranteed the rights of religious 
minorities, provided for representative government and sought to 
curb the authority of Iran‘s monarchy.95 Prior to the 1953 coup 
against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, Iranian nationalists 
sought to turn the Iranian monarchy into a purely ceremonial office, 
and to preserve a limited role for the clergy in judicial and family 
 
 93. Id. at 39. 
 94. Id. at 48. 
 95. Contrasting Iran‘s 1906 Constitution with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic is 
an interesting case study in how laws and constitutions can be manipulated by autocrats to 
serve political ends. The 1906 Constitution, on its surface, actually appears to grant powers 
to the clergy that are similar to those granted by the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, 
including requirements that government officials be Muslims and the granting of judicial 
power to clerics, and contains far less language about civil, political, and women‘s rights. 
QANUNI ASSAASSI IRAN [IRANIAN CONSTITUTION] 1906. Iran‘s last monarch, Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi, contemptuous of both liberal democracy and what he perceived to be clerical 
reactionaries, largely ignored both the democratic and religious character of Iran‘s 
constitution as he sought to build a secular, modern state. See generally ABBAS MILANI, THE 
SHAH (2011). After the revolution, Iran‘s mullahs have largely ignored the more progressive 
clauses of the Islamic Republic‘s constitution in favor of their own ideological vision. See 
supra notes 69–86 and accompanying text. 
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affairs, in a way that would have resembled the systems established 
in countries like Germany and the United Kingdom.96  
CONCLUSION 
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increasing 
trend towards holding democracy as a universal norm, and a trend 
towards international de-legitimization of efforts by governments to 
subvert democratic institutions and procedures.97 The philosophical 
grandfather of this argument was Francis Fukayama, but Thomas 
Franck‘s The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, set the 
stage for a much broader conversation about whether a right to 
democratic governance existed in international law.98 There has also 
been an increasing body of treaty law, such as the ICCPR, the ECHR, 
the ACHR, the ACHPR, and the OAS Charter, that forms a body of 
custom with respect to the universality of democratic norms.99  
Given the emerging customary international norm in favor of 
democratic governance, the Islamic Republic of Iran has failed to 
meet its obligations under this norm, most prominently under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.100 In addition to 
failing to hold regular and genuine elections, Iran has failed to respect 
other rights essential to the functioning of democracy under the 
ICCPR, including freedom of association, freedom of the press, and 
the right to a fair trial.101 Iran‘s civic and political structures are equal 
to the task of resolving these problems, and there is nothing inherent 
in Iranian history or in Islam that would prevent Iran from making a 
successful transition to democracy. Finally, while the Iranian political 
system would have to change radically in order to accommodate 
democratic change, Iran would not necessarily have to go down the 




 96. See generally STEPHEN KINZER, ALL THE SHAH‘S MEN: AN AMERICAN COUP AND THE 
ROOTS OF MIDDLE EAST TERROR (2003). 
 97. See supra Part I. 
 98. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
 99. See supra Part II. 
 100. See supra Part III. 
 101. See supra Part II. 
 102. See supra notes 88–95 and accompanying text. 
